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n most industrialized economies inﬂation tends to be pro-cyclical; that is,
inﬂation is high during times of high economic activity. When economic
activityismeasuredbytheunemploymentratethisstatisticalrelationship
is known as the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve is sometimes viewed as a
menu for monetary policymakers, that is, they can choose between high in-
ﬂation and low unemployment or low inﬂation and high unemployment. But
this interpretation of the Phillips curve assumes that the relationship between
unemployment and inﬂation is structural and will not break down once a pol-
icymaker attempts to exploit the perceived tradeoff. After the high inﬂation
episodesexperiencedbymanyeconomiesinthe1970s,thisstructuralinterpre-
tation of the Phillips curve was discredited. Yet, after a period of low inﬂation
inthe1980sandearly1990s,economistshaveagainworkedonastructuralin-
terpretationofthePhillipscurve. ThisNewKeynesianPhillipscurve(NKPC)
assumes the presence of nominal price rigidities. In this special issue of the
Economic Quarterly, we publish four surveys on the history of the Phillips
curve, the structural estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and the
policy implications of the nominal rigidities underlying the New Keynesian
Phillips curve.
The Phillips Curve and U.S. Economic Policy
Robert King surveys the evolution of the Phillips curve itself and its usage
in U.S. economic policymaking from the 1960s to the mid-1990s. He ﬁrst
describes how, in the 1960s, the Phillips curve became an integral part of U.S.
macroeconomic policy in its pursuit of low unemployment rates. A stylized
version of the Phillips curve that emerges from this period relates current
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γ iπt−i − βut.
Similartootherelementsofthethen-standardKeynesianIS-LMmacromodel,
economists would tell stories that motivated the Phillips curve but the Phillips
curve was not derived from an explicit theory. Furthermore, the estimated
parameters were taken as structural, in particular as invariant to policy inter-
ventions. In the late 1960s, Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968) interpreted
the Phillips curve as arising from search and information frictions in labor
markets, and they argued that the relation between a real variable such as
unemployment and nominal inﬂation was based on misperceptions about in-




where πe denotes expected inﬂation. If, as Phelps and Friedman argued,
ρ = 1, then a tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment exists only to the
extent that actual inﬂation deviates from expected inﬂation. At the time, in-
ﬂation expectations were modeled as adaptive, that is, a geometric distributed
lag of past actual inﬂation. In this case, for a constant actual inﬂation rate
the expected inﬂation rate would eventually converge to the actual inﬂation
rate and the unemployment rate would settle down at its natural rate. Thus,
there is no long-run tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment. Although
Phelps and Friedman’s argument originally represented a minority view in
the profession, the argument became more widely accepted in the 1970s after
periods of high inﬂation and unemployment.
Accounting for the instability of the Phillips curve in the 1970s had
lasting effects on the way macroeconomic analysis was done and contin-
ues to be done today. First, since expectations play a crucial role in the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, it seemed necessary not to resort to
some arbitrary assumption on the expectations mechanism. For this purpose,
macroeconomists started to assume that expectations are rational. By this we
mean that expectations are such that they do not lead to systematic mistakes
given the available information. Sargent and Wallace (1975) used the idea
of rational expectations in an otherwise standard IS-LM macromodel with
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve to argue that systematic monetary
policy actions do not systematically affect unemployment or output. Second,
macroeconomists not only started to work with model-consistent expecta-
tions in otherwise ad hoc models, but they started to study the optimal choices
of economic agents in explicitly speciﬁed environments agents; that is, they
started to study macroeconomic questions using the tools of general equilib-
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Phelps-FriedmanPhillipscurveinanenvironmentwhereagentshaddifﬁculty
sorting out their own relative price shocks from aggregate price level shocks.
Kingdescribeshow,attheendofthe1970safteryearsofpersistentlyhigh
inﬂationandhighunemployment, monetarypolicymakersmovedtolowerthe
inﬂation rate. At that time, the debate centered on the perceived cost (in terms
of elevated unemployment) associated with a reduction of the inﬂation rate.
On the one hand, proponents of the more standard Phillips curve argued that
these costs would be substantial. On the other hand, proponents of a rational
expectations-augmented Phillips curve argued that the costs could be quite
low, especially if the low inﬂation policy was credible to the public. In the
end,theFederalReserveunderPaulVolckerreducedinﬂationoverarelatively
short time period at some cost, but not as high a cost as predicted by standard
Phillipscurves. Fortheremainderofthe1980sandtheearly1990s,theFederal
Reserve under Alan Greenspan further lowered average inﬂation and, in the
process, strengthened its credibility for continued low inﬂation policies. King
ends his survey in the mid-1990s when the Federal Reserve Board’s mone-
tarypolicymodelincorporatedanexpectations-augmentedPhillipscurvewith
elements of rational expectations, and the Federal Open Market Committee
debated the desirability of a target for low long-run inﬂation and what that
target should be.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
At the time that U.S. inﬂation started to decline in the 1980s there was a
resurgence of interest in business cycle analysis. Continuing the general equi-
librium program in macroeconomics started with Lucas (1972), real business
cycle analysis developed quantitative models of the aggregate economy based
onthestochasticneoclassicalgrowthmodel,e.g.,KydlandandPrescott(1982)
or Long and Plosser (1983). Using simulation studies, one could show that
these models were able to mimic the U.S. business cycle in terms of the statis-
tical properties of the time series of a limited number of aggregate variables
(output, consumption, investment, and employment). As the name indicates,
real business cycle theory addressed the behavior of quantities and relative
prices over the business cycle, implicitly assuming that money is neutral.
Working on the assumption that money is not neutral, economists in the mid-
1990s then started to introduce nominal price rigidities into these models,
now also known as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els. From this research program emerged the New Keynesian Phillips curve
that relates actual and expected inﬂation not to the unemployment rate but to a
measure of aggregate marginal cost. The second and third paper in this issue
discuss the estimation of the structural parameters of the NKPC.
Once one assumes that nominal prices do not continuously adjust to
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Almost all of the work on nominal price rigidities has answered this question
using the framework of monopolistic competition, which assumes that the
product whose price has to be determined is produced by a proﬁt-maximizing
monopoly. There may be imperfect substitutes for the monopolist’s product;
that is, the demand for the product depends not only on its own price but also
onthepricesofthesubstitutes. Whenthemonopolistdecidesonhisownprice
he will, however, take these other prices as given, hence the term monopolis-
tic competition. A monopolist that can continuously adjust his nominal price
will set the price to equate contemporaneous marginal revenue and marginal
cost and the price will be a markup over marginal cost. Compare this with
ﬂexible prices in perfectly competitive markets where the price and marginal
cost are equated. If nominal prices cannot be continuously readjusted, then
the monopolist will choose the current nominal price such that he equates the
expected present value of marginal revenue and marginal cost over the time
that the price remains ﬁxed.
The model of an individual monopolistically competitive producer is then
typically embedded into a general equilibrium model with a large number
of these producers, e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). These producers
are identical except for the time when they can adjust their nominal price.
Various mechanisms for price adjustment have been proposed; most assume
that the opportunity for price adjustment is exogenously given. One popular
modeling technique is a Calvo-type price adjustment where, each period, a
ﬁrmgetstoadjustitspricewithsomeprobabilitythatisﬁxedovertime. Using
Calvo-type price adjustment, Woodford (2003) shows that the aggregation of
the linearized optimal price adjustment rules for the individual ﬁrms yields an
expressionincurrentandexpectedfutureinﬂationandameasureofaggregate
marginal cost, mc,
πt = γ fEtπt+1 + λmct + ξt.
This is the structural NKPC where γ f and λ are functions of structural pa-
rameters, including the probability of price adjustment, α, and ξt is a random
variable. The random disturbance is often interpreted as an exogenous shock
to the ﬁrms’ markup. Solving this difference equation forward, one can see
that current and expected future marginal cost are driving today’s inﬂation.
For most measures of inﬂation and what could be considered reasonable
measures of marginal cost, inﬂation tends to be more persistent than marginal
cost. Since marginal cost “drives” inﬂation in the basic NKPC, this makes it
hard for the model to match the data. Economists have, therefore, modiﬁed
the basic NKPC by introducing “rule of thumb” price adjusters or ﬁrms that
simply index their price to the aggregate inﬂation rate, e.g., Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999). These assumptions lead to the inclusion of lagged inﬂation,
πt = γ bπt−1 + γ fEtπt+1 + λmct + ξt,A. Hornstein: Introduction 305
and, therefore, make the NKPC a hybrid of the basic NKPC and more stan-
dard Phillips curves. The coefﬁcients γ b, γ f, and λ are again functions of
structural parameters. The ability of monetary policy to control inﬂation with
a NKPC depends on the relative magnitudes of these coefﬁcients. Loosely
speaking, monetary policy affects inﬂation through its effects on marginal
cost. Thus, the smaller the coefﬁcient on marginal cost, the less impact mon-
etary policy will have on inﬂation. In the extreme case when λ = 0, inﬂation
evolves independently of monetary policy and whatever else happens in the
rest of economy. How “costly” it is to reduce inﬂation depends on the relative
magnitude of the coefﬁcients on past and future inﬂation, γ b and γ f. If the
coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation is large, then inﬂation is mostly driven by its
ownpastandpolicyactionsmightaffectinﬂationonlywithalongtimelag. In
order to evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy actions we, therefore,
need estimates of these parameters.
Single-Equation Estimation of the NKPC
In the second paper of this issue, James Nason and Gregor Smith survey
the estimation of the parameters of the NKPC using only the NKPC itself.
Single-equation estimation of the NKPC parameters is appealing because it
does not require any assumption on how the rest of the economy should be
speciﬁed. Yet standard ordinary least squares estimation of the NKPC is not
applicable since expected inﬂation in the NKPC is an endogenous variable
that is correlated with the error term of the estimation equation. Consistent
parameterestimatescanstillbeobtainedthroughtheuseoftheGeneralMethod
of Moments (GMM) technique, which in turn requires instrumental variables
that are correlated with expected inﬂation but uncorrelated with the other
variables in the NKPC.
Nason and Smith report that, in general, estimated parameters for the
hybrid NKPC are consistent with prior restrictions. For example, estimated
priceadjustmentprobabilitiesarebetweenzeroandone. Theyalsoﬁndthatthe
coefﬁcient on expected future inﬂation tends to be larger than the coefﬁcient
on lagged inﬂation. This suggests that monetary policy can affect inﬂation in
the short term. Nason and Smith also discuss the ﬁnding that the estimated
coefﬁcient on marginal cost tends to be small and barely signiﬁcant. This is
bad news for the NKPC as a model of inﬂation and for monetary policy.
Theambiguousevidenceonthemarginalcostcoefﬁcientmayberelatedto
weak identiﬁcation through weak instrumental variables in the GMM estima-
tion. Instrumental variables are essentially used to forecast expected inﬂation
independent of the other variables in the NKPC. For an instrumental variable
to serve its purpose it has to be correlated with expected future inﬂation and
it should not be correlated with marginal cost and current and lagged inﬂa-
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shown that lagged inﬂation tends to be a good forecast of future inﬂation and
it is difﬁcult to improve on that forecast. This suggests that the instrumental
variables in the GMM procedure are quite weak. Nason and Smith then show
that after one takes into account that we have weak instruments, the evidence
in favor of the NKPC is weakened or the NKPC is rejected outright.
System Estimation of the NKPC
In the third paper of this issue, Frank Schorfheide surveys system methods to
estimate the parameters of the NKPC. For this approach one speciﬁes a more
or less complete model of the aggregate economy, a DSGE model, and then
identiﬁes the structural parameters from the restrictions that the equilibrium
process imposes on the moments of a set of observable variables.
Using a simple example, Schorfheide interprets the various identiﬁcation
schemes used in the literature. He explains why it may not be possible to
obtain consistent parameter estimates using single-equation methods. System
methods on the other hand can obtain consistent parameter estimates through
the imposition of prior constraints on elements of the DSGE model other than
the NKPC. Essentially these prior restrictions allow one to identify exoge-
nous shocks that may serve as instruments for the NKPC. As an example,
Schorfheide points to the procedure of identifying monetary policy shocks
from the restriction that the public cannot respond to contemporaneous mon-
etary policy shocks. Schorfheide also suggests that it may not be possible
to identify the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation in the NKPC if one allows for
serially correlated markup shocks. Indeed, single-equation estimates of the
NKPC identify γ b through the implicit prior restriction that the markup shock
isi.i.d. Thislackofidentiﬁcationaffectstheevaluationofpolicyeffectiveness
if it also implies that the coefﬁcient on future inﬂation is not identiﬁed.
Schorfheide then surveys papers that estimate the NKPC as part of a more
complete DSGE model. Most of this empirical work uses data on output, in-
ﬂation, and a nominal interest rate. Marginal cost in the NKPC is then treated
as a latent variable that is constructed from the observable variables and the
equilibrium relationships implied by the DSGE model. But some empirical
work also includes measures of marginal cost in the set of observable vari-
ables. Schorfheide observes that the range for the estimated coefﬁcients on
marginal cost in the NKPC is much larger when marginal cost is a latent vari-
able. The range of estimated NKPC coefﬁcients on marginal cost becomes
much closer to that obtained from single-equation estimations once obser-
vations on marginal cost are included. Thus, with marginal cost as a latent
variable, features of the DSGE model that are different from the NKPC can
become much more important for the determination of the NKPC marginal
cost coefﬁcient. As is apparent from the work of Krause, L´ opez-Salido, and
Lubik (2008), the implied process for the latent marginal cost variable is thenA. Hornstein: Introduction 307
very different from the process of various measures of marginal cost used in
the literature.
In general, the literature review suggests that there is no consensus on
the magnitude and role of nominal rigidities in the estimated price-setting
process. Furthermore, introducing additional nominal rigidities in the wage-
setting process affects the estimates for nominal rigidities in the price-setting
process, that is, the NKPC. It also appears as if the relative role of nominal
price and wage rigidities is not identiﬁed from the data.
Policy Implications of Nominal Price Rigidities
Intheﬁnalpaperofthisissue, StephanieSchmitt-Groh´ eandMart´ ınUribedis-
cuss the implications of nominal price rigidities for optimal monetary policy.
They ﬁrst ask how the presence of nominal price rigidities affects the design
of optimal policy when ﬁscal and monetary policy are jointly determined.
They then go on to study if simple policy rules such as the Taylor rule can get
the economy close to the optimal policy outcome. They ﬁnd that with small
amounts of nominal price rigidities, optimal policy involves price stability,
i.e., it tightly stabilizes inﬂation at zero, and that simple rules that exclusively
focus on deviations from price stability get the economy very close to the
optimum.
These results provide a nice contrast between optimal monetary policy in
environments with and without nominal rigidities. When nominal prices are
ﬂexible and there is a well-deﬁned demand for real balances, a zero nominal
interest and, hence, deﬂation minimize the welfare costs from holding money.
Furthermore, if in a stochastic environment ﬁscal policy has to use distor-
tionary taxes to ﬁnance given expenditures, mean zero unanticipated changes
in the inﬂation rate represent lump-sum taxes and are an efﬁcient way to raise
revenues. Thus, optimal policy leads to low and volatile inﬂation. In contrast
with nominal rigidities, deviations from price stability introduce relative price
distortions among the monopolistically competitive producers and make pro-
duction inefﬁcient. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe argue that in environments that
contain both a well-deﬁned demand for real money and nominal rigidities,
even small amounts of nominal rigidities imply that price stability is optimal.
This is a useful result since the surveys of Nason and Smith and Schorfheide
provide some evidence for the presence of nominal rigidities, but also show
that there is no agreement on how substantial nominal rigidities are.
Optimalpoliciesthatdetermineﬁscalandmonetarypoliciesjointlycanbe
quitecomplicated, yetSchmitt-Groh´ eandUribeshowthatsimplepolicyrules
involve only minor welfare losses relative to the optimal policy. These simple
rulesaremodeledontheTaylorrulethathasthenominalinterestrespondingto
deviations of inﬂation and output from their targets with some dependence on
past interest rates. It turns out that a simple rule that aggressively targets price308 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
stability involves only minimal welfare losses relative to the optimal policy,
and that a response to deviations of output from trend signiﬁcantly decreases
welfare. An open question remains why most monetary policymakers prefer
to target some positive inﬂation rate rather than price stability with a zero
inﬂation rate.
Conclusion
The surveys in this special issue show that discussions of the Phillips curve
have been at the core of monetary policymaking since the 1960s. Our un-
derstanding of what underlies the correlation between unemployment and the
inﬂation rate and what that means for monetary policymaking has changed
overtheyears. Atﬁrst, manyeconomistsandpolicymakerstookthestatistical
relationship as a ﬁxed menu of choices between inﬂation and unemployment
and targeted relatively low unemployment outcomes. From the period of high
inﬂation and high unemployment in the 1970s, economists emerged believ-
ing that there is no inﬂation-unemployment tradeoff that remains invariant to
policy interventions, and policymakers agreed that the objective of monetary
policy should be low and stable inﬂation. Finally, in the 1990s, economists
again started to study the inﬂation-output tradeoff using the new techniques
developed in macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s, rational expectations
and explicit quantitative general equilibrium models of the aggregate econ-
omy. This research program gave rise to the NKPC, which is based on the
maintained assumption of nominal price rigidities. As is apparent from the
surveysinthisissue,thereissomesupportfortheNKPCinaggregatedata,but
there is no agreement on the extent of nominal price rigidities in the aggregate
economy. Furthermore, one should be aware that not all macroeconomists
agree that nominal rigidities are relevant for an understanding of the aggre-
gate economy, e.g., see Williamson (2008) or Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2009) for a skeptical view on this research program. To be sure, research
on the relationship between unemployment and inﬂation will remain an ac-
tive area in macroeconomics for anyone with an interest in applied monetary
economics.
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